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THE GROWTH OF IRON & STEEL INDUSTRY IN JAPAN 
AND THE PROBLEM OF RAW MATERIALS (II) 
By 
Kazuichiro Ono* and Heitaro Namba ** 
III. Coal and Pig. Iron Situation. 
A. Coal: 
With the development of pig iron manufacturing at Kamaishi, coal 
especially coking coal sapplies to the iron manufacturing industry came to 
assume a higher importance inplace of. charcoal as its sourse of fuel sup-
plies. This is due to the gradual decrease of charcoal supply and also due 
to a m1.rked rise in the cost of its transportation. This change from char-
coal to coal was inevitable so long as the charcoal manufacturing industry 
as a sort of forestry failed, under various factors resulting from land mo-
nopoly and natural circumstances, to bring about a corresponding expansion 
of its productive capacity, as well as a consequent lowering in prices to 
meet the mounting demand. Under a certain natural and geographical 
condition, the charcoal manfacturing industry, compared with coal iron ore; 
and other mining industry, can not produce tangible results within a cestain 
period of time owing the natural limitation in the growth of trees and other 
natural conditions, whereas there is no such limitation in the mining indu-
stry. It should be recalled, in this connection, that, during the latter part 
of the 18th century, the process of iron manufacturing with cokes witnes-
sed a rapid progress in England, spurred by an acute shortage of charcoal. 
In Japan, charcoal was in dire shortage at Kamaishi in 1882. In 1892, 
anxiety concerning the shortage of supply of charcoal was again expressed in 
a report submitted by Kageyoshi Noro. Under these conditions, the authori-
ties of the Ministry of Industry took steps to rehabilitate the 25-ton blast 
furnace, which had previously been discarded, for the purpose of manufact 
uringi pig iron using cokes. In the following year, the· repair and 
the installation of a coke furnace was completed, and, was put into 
* The author is lecturer of Economics at Kyoto University 
** The author is a member of Kyoto University Economic Society 
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operation immediately. Similar attempt had already been made in Japan 
In 1882 at Kamaishi. This, however, ended in a complete failUre no 
account of incomplete preliminary study of the properties of cokes. 
The replacement of charcoal by cokes as the fuel for the iron manu-
facturing industry thus push to the fore the question of coal, especially 
coking coal as the center of the raw material problems. 
The remarkable increase in the production of pig iron at Kamaishi, 
which coutributed to the changing over from charcoal to cokes, was firstly 
due to the fact that the ore deposit there, upon a re-survey, conducted in 
1892 jumped to a favourable estimate of no less than 14,000,000 tons, from 
an earlier estimated of mere 130,000 tons in 1883 and several milion tons 
in 1890. The second factor Was due to the reduction in .production cost 
following a rationalization program effected at Kamaishi, and thirdly, to 
the circumstances that the business depression, which had first asserted 
itself in 1890, had by 1892 told out its worst and that a reduced silver 
price had induced an increase in exports. The situation was further brigh-
tened by an improvement in the business condition with a greater demand 
for iron and steel ensuing on the eve of an imminent war against China. 
This served to consolidate the foundation of Kamaishi. Japan's victory in 
this war offered one of the major factors which went to stimulate the com-
pletion of the process of fuel conversion. 
These circumstances brought about an eventual tie-up of the 
country's iron manufacturing system and the coal mining system and such 
combination, an a still larger scale, was to be materialized in the form of 
the Yawata Iron Works. In the following lines an attempt will be made 
to trace the process of the development of coal mining industry in our 
country. 
Toward the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate and in the early years 
of the Meiji era, the European capitalist powers first placed an eye on the 
mining and transportation industries as the object of their profit-seeking 
schemes. Mindful of the danger inherent in an overdue reliance on 
foreign capital on the part of the backward nation, the Meiji Govern-
ment issued a special Mining Regulation in 1872 stating that the ores 
produced as well as the right of mining belong to the State. In the fol-
lowing year, a mining law was promulgated, stipulating that only persons 
of Japanese nationality would be permitted to be an proprietor or a member 
of an enterprise engaging in trial mining, the leasing of a mining zone 
and the processing of the ores produced. The purport of this law was 
to preclude an unrestricted influx of foreign capital into the mining industry 
of Japan. Thus, as far as the coal mining industry was concerned, the 
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Miike and Takashima coal mines which had been under joint manage-
ment of the feudal clan of Saga and a Britisher, Grabber, since the last 
years of the Shogunate regime, and the Kayanuma and Horonai mines 
were placed under Government controls in 1873, 1876 and 1877, respecti-
vely.!) At the same time, the Japanese Government authorities endevored 
to hire foreign engineers in order to induce advanced Western mining 
techniques in to the country. 
From the end of 1880, the Government modified its policy: an overall 
direct Government control formula was replaced by that of selective super-
vision, and this, incidentally, marked the beginning of the period of the 
so-called Matsukata deflation (bearing the name of the then-Finance Mi-
nister Prince Masayoshi Matsukata). The point here was that those in-
dustries with less military importance were handed over to private manage-
ment while others which were considered more important militarily as well 
as those directly connected to military production were gradually placed 
under either government monopoly or direct control. This resulted in 
placing japan's coal mining industry on an immutable foundation, begin-
ning in 1887. Following the step of the Takashima coal mines, which had 
already been handed over to private management, the Miike coal mines 
were entrusted in 1899 to the Mitui financial clique (Zaibatsu). At the 
same time, the Government, in 1885, took measures to designate the Chikuh6 
(in north Kyushu) coal mine area as a special reseved mining area for the 
needs of the Imperial Navy. The Mitsui and the Mitsubishi, on the other 
hand, were not behind the Government in making advances in the Chikuh6 
region.') Thus, in 1887, japan's coal mining industry came to a turning 
point, presenting a very different picture, as isolated coal mines, dispersed 
over a wide area either under direct Government control or private manage-
ment, were steadily concentrated in the Chikuho coal mine area, where 
both the Government and the Zaibatsu factions were to compete in the 
profitable management of majior coal mines. (Refer Table 1) 
Table I Coal Output at ChikuhO (Unit 1000 tons) . , 
I ChikuhO outpt Total domestic output I % 
1885 236.0 1,293.7 18 
1887 410.0 1,746.2 23 
1892 1,039.7 3,175.6 32 
1897 2,726.3 5,207.5 52 
Note. (1) The Takashima mines were sold to Sh6jir6 Goto in 1874. In 1881, these mines 
further changed hands and were placed under the Mitsui. 
(2) Kaijima, 1884; Mitsubishi, 1889; Sumitomo, 1894; Furukawa, 1894, and Mitsui, 1896. 
, 
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A similar formula was likewise applied to the Hokkaid6 and J6ban 
(in north Kant6 district) region, where, the coal mining industry was also 
given an initial impetus for development by Government direction, and, 
then, headed to further expansion under able private hands. As for the 
exploitation of the coal industry in the Hokkaido, the first steps taken 
were the carrying out of a thorough geographical survey at the hands of 
an American named Lyman Monroe, who conducted the difficult work 
under a special request by the local Japanese authorities. L. Monroe, 
further, undertook the management of the Kayanuma and Horonai mines. 
In 1889, the Hokkaido Tank6 Tetsud6 Company (affiliated to the ex-
feudal clan of Satsuma; later re-named the Hokkaid6 Tank6 Kisen 
Company, when the organisation was taken over by the Mitsui) was 
inaugurated. The new company placed three major mines, the Horonai, 
the Ikushunbetsu and the Sorachi as well as local railway network, under 
its management. In the following year, the company embarked upon the 
development of the Y iibari mines. In spite of all these measures, the situa-
tion in the Hokkaid6 could not compare with the Chikuh6 area in Kyiishii, 
both in respect to the speed with which it was developed and to the ex-
tent of the effort made for its development. And, this difference in the 
development between the two area was, no doubt, due not only to the 
existence of richer coal deposit in the Chikuh6 Area but also due to the 
importance of Norther Kyiishii Area from military and economio points of 
VIew. 
While Japan's victory in the Sino.Japanese War made the importance 
of the Chikuh6 Area decisive, this was also the main factor of the Yawata's 
further expansion. In November, 1897, the Yawata bought up the Futase 
coal mines in the Chikuh6 ara for securing coking coal supplies. Subse-
quently, they concentrated their efforts in securing its control over Tayeh 
(in China). These moves implied a trend toward a combination between 
Japan's iron and steel manufacturing orgnisation, depended heavily on the 
supply of iron ores obtained at Chinese and other territorial mines and 
coal-mining industry in Japan. Such combination, at the same time, 
signified a handshake between the State capital and the monopolistic 
Zaibatsu capital. The importance of the Chikuh6 mine area was further 
increased to meet the needs of the gigantic Yawata Iron Works. 
This, on the other hand, meant that Japan had within its reach a 
highly important military and economio "base" on the China continent. 
The transition from charcal to cokes as marterial for making pig iron at 
Kamaishi and its tie-up with the Yiibari coal mines and the close combina-
tion. effceted between Yawata and the Chikuh6 not only bespeak the pre-
54 K. ONO & H. NAYBA 
ponderant importance of the question of coal supply occupying in Japan's 
iron manufacturing industry but also indicate the direction in which a 
solution, if any, of that vital issue was to be sought. 
This, however, did never mean that a solution was there already. In , 
the lines that follow, an effort will be made to describe the circumstances 
relative to the problem of coal. 
There is now available no reliable data indicating the total amount 
of coal (especially coal for making cokes) being consumed by the entire 
range of the iron manufacturing industry of Japan in the early Meiji 
years. According to a statistical table of coal delivered to the Yawata 
Iron Works, however, it is seen that, with the years 1904-1905 as a 
turning point, the consumption of coal soared rapidly up above the 400, 
OOO-ton level. Shiro Watanabe, in his "Synthetic Coal and Coal as 
Raw Material ", estimates that the consumption of coal by Japan's iron 
and steel industry stood at approximately 430,000 tons in 1897, 900,000 
tons at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and at about 1,000,000 
tons toward the end of the Meiji era. What should be noted with 
special attention is the fact that, with the exception of a small quantity 
of coal imported from overseas in 1906, most of coal consumed up to 
1907 was produced domestically. The Yawata Iron Works, .at its in 
auguration, planned to obtain its own source of coal, especially coking 
coal and as to be mentioned above they moved to buy the Futase mines. 
An authentic chronological description of the history of Yawata refers 
to the fact that in the early days of its establishment, they chiefly depened 
on their coal supplies from the Futase coal mines, followed by Mike, 
Takashima and other minor mines located in the Chikuho mine area. 
It is noted, in this connection, that this program succeeded to a certain 
extent in the 1890's. That Yawata was so eager in obtaining access to 
the Tayeh iron ores may well be accountedf or the fact that the supply 
of coal needed for its foundry could thus be assured from a number of 
domestic mines. However, the program was not without its defects, and 
this was already noticed in the 1890's. The major portion of coal 
produced in Japan was of low grade, which, although suitable for generating 
gas, heating boilers and other heating purposes, was not fit for coking 
coal used in the blast furnaces. Yiibari and Futase were about the only 
mines which could produce coal fit for the latter purposes, and even coal 
obtained at these mines were not considered to be perfectly suitable for 
making cokes to be fed to the blast furnaces. 
Indeed, one of the main reasons of the failure of the blast furnace 
operation in the initial stage was to be found in such inferior quality of 
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the cokes available. In order to meet the growing consumption of coal 
as a result of the successive installation of blast furnaces following the 
Russo-Japanese War, and also due to the necessity of over coming the 
defects inherent in the quality of domestic cokes, Kamaishi, started to 
import the Kaiping coal from 1909, which was mixed with the Yiibari 
coal at the ratio of 25% to 75%. On the other hand, Yawata Iron Works 
also undertook to import high quality bituminous coal produced at Pen-
shihu in Manchuria and Kaiping in North China, in 1910. The coal im-
ported from the Chinese mainland was mixed with the domestic coal, which 
resulted in improving the operational efficiency of the blast furnaces, and 
also opened the way for an eventual successful attempt at manufacturing 
such cokes as would stand use for large blast furnaces. The immediate 
result was the lowering of the coke cost, which, in 1909, stood at 11.63 
yen, occupying 41% of the production cost per ton of pig iron at Yawata, 
to 7.13 yen, corresponding to 35% of the production cost in 1912. This 
was largely due to a reduction in the amount of cokes used as well as a 
general decline of the coal price. The improvement of the quality of co-
kes, coupled by an additional income accruing from by-products of coke 
manufacturing was also responsible for such reduction, while it should not 
be overlooked that the lowering of the production cost of pig iron during 
these years was chiefly due to the reduction in the cost of coke. (Refer 
Table 2) 
The fact, mentioned above, is highly important as indicating that Ja-
pan's iron and steel manufacturing industry was enabled on its own only 
after a steady supply of coal from the Chinese mainland was assured 
during the last years of the Meiji era. In 1912 Yawata Iron Works 
secured its coking coal from the following sources: 
Futase coal .................. 200,000 tons (66%) 
Penshihu coal... ... ... ...... 40,000 tons (13%) 
Kaiping coal .................. 30,000 tons (10%) 
Miike coal ..................... 20,000 tons ( 7%) 
Takashima coal.. ............. 12,000 tons ( 4%) 
The foregoing breakdown clearly indicates that the major portion of 
coal supplied to Yawata Iron Works was still occupied by· the domesti-
cally-produced coal. On the other hand, the overall coal situation inJapan 
Was such that, against 320,000 tons of coal imported from overseas, she 
Was still capable to export roughly ten times as much. From this, we can 
see that, at that time, coal was imported to our country owing to the 
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scarecity of high quality 
coal and not from the 
lack of quantilty. Indeed, 
the problem of low cost, 
high quality iron ore and 
coal lay at the very foun-
dation of the iron and 
steel industry in Japan, 
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Table 2. Ratio of Cokes Cost against. Total 
Pig Iron Cost at Yawata Iron Works (Unit Yen per ton) 
'~~I Cokes cost I Iron Ores 
Years 
I Total cost 
1909 I I I. 63 I II. 88 I 28.42 (41%) (42%) (100) 
1912 I 7.13 I 9.54 I 20.20 ! (35%) (47%) (\00) 
because, she then was still considerably backward technically, and was 
not in a position to expect a sufficiently big production of by-products in 
the course of iron manufacturing, and thus, the problem naturally posed 
a factor. vital to the very existence of our iron and steel industry. And, 
this particular circumstance was responsible for the fact that, following the 
termination of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan lost no time in moving to 
place under her exclusive control the Fushun coal mine in Manchuria 
(1905), the anthracite coal mine at Pyongyang in Korea (1907, placed 
under direct Naval Control in 1922), the Penshihu mine (developed by 
the Okura Zaibatsu in 1909). Japan's advances on the Chinese miainland, 
it is noted, was destined to bring her into violent competition with Britain, 
who, at about the same time, launched on the programs of expansion of 
the Kaiping (later known as Kailen) coal mine. 
B. Pig Iron: 
It is generally said that it was after the end of World War I, and 
also with the assumption of greater importance by the civilian steel 
manufacturers during the last decade of the Meiji era, that the problem 
of pig iron as material came to assume greater importance in the iron 
and steel manufacturing industry in Japan. If, however, this theory is 
taken to mean that pig iron had not until this time had any importance 
as material, it would be to commit a grave error. To understand the 
situation in this connection, it would be imperative that the history of pig 
iron, tracing the course which led it to such an important position in 
japan's iron and steel industry, be duly taken into consideration. A brief 
description of such history will be given in the lines that follow. 
Until the founding of the Yawata Iron Works, most ste.el was manu-
factured in Japan at army arsenals, where the industry saw a steady growth. 
In spite of the failure of the government-run iron manufacturing plants 
during the first decade of the Meiji era, the persistent requirements for 
manufacturing armament compelled Japan to embark upon a big arms 
expansion program after 1882. With the imminence of a frontal armed 
clash with China during the second decade of Meiji, faced mounting needs 
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of manufacturing steel,at her own arsenals. At the time of the Sino-Japa-
~nese War, however, the output of steel in Japan amounted to mere 1,200 
tons, while no modern steel manufacturing factories had yet been inaugu-
rated with private funds. Most of the demand for iron and steel by private 
enterprise was met by the import and domestic produotion of steel was 
carried out only at the military arsenals. This is one factor which explains 
the fact that in Japan the pig iron and steel manufacturing industries had 
to follow a separate course of development. And, this further explains the 
reason why the plans submitted for construction of steel foundry during 
the second decade of Meiji were originally intended to meet military require-
ments. The separation of pig iron and steel manufacturing persisted even 
after the establishment of Yawata Iron Works and the advance of Kama-
ishi into the field of steel manufacturing. It continued, on a bigger scale, 
after the phenomenous rise of civilian steel manufacturing works during 
the closing years of Meiji and following the termination of the World 
War 1.') 
Now, pig iron as a raw material has peculiar significance in exerting 
direct influences on both the pig iron manufacturing and steel manufactur-
ing industries. 
With the founding of the Yawata Iron Works, 50 % of the total de-
mand of pig iron in our country was manufactured domestically, but Japan 
was still not in a position to free herself from the persistent pressure being 
exerted by imported pig iron. At this time, domestic price level of pig 
iron was controlled by the price of English-manufactured pig iron. The 
foreign-imported pig iron, which had over-ruled the pig iron manufactured 
by the original Japanese method and also that manufactured at Kamaishi, 
during the first and second decade of the Meiji era, still retained its 
leadership. Even with a considerable decline in the market price per ton of 
pig iron manufactured at Kamaishi due to the reduction of its production 
cost following the development and improved production facilities at 
(3): Main reasons why steel manufacturing industry developed in Japan separately from 
pig iron manufaturing industry may be found in the fact: 
(a) that those who engage in steel manufacturing industry was required less investment 
than those who manufature both pig iron and steel, while the fund invested was rotated 
more quickly; 
(b) that the superior technique already attained in army atsenals could be fully utilized, 
and that the any rendered a positive assistance to it. While it cannot be denied that 
aU this originated from the predominant needs of preparing for the imminent war with 
Russta, it should not be left out of consideration that the product found the largest de-
mand from Government offices like the Board of Railways, and the armed services. 
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Kamaishi, the price of domestic pig iron was still higher than imported 
pig iron as seen in Table 3. 
Table 3. Comparison of Pig Iron Prices (Unit Yen ·per ton) 
~~I Market price I Import price I Market price of Kamaishi . of foreign of imported pig iron pig iron pig iron 
1882 31.20 19.23 27.50 
I 
1893 23.30 19.55 unknown 
That, in spite of the reduction of the production cost due to the con-
tinuned expansion of Yawata Iron Works and the consequent favorable 
competition with imported pig iron, the price of the domestically manu-
factured pig iron had to follow the steps of foreign-made pig iron is clearly 
indicated in Table 4. 
Table 4. Comparison of Price of 
Foreign & Domestic Pig Iron 
(Unit Yen per ton) 
1:S: Import Price. Dcmestic Price Years 
1901 38.4 yen 41. 3 yen 
1902 34.0 , 37.9 
1903 34,0 37.9 
1904 35. 7 38.8 
1905 38.0 53. 7 
1906 38.2 37.2 
1907 39.9 41. 0 
1908 36.5 39.5 
1909 32. 1 35.9 
1910 32.4 36.7 
1911 33.8 38.4 
1912 36.2 43.3 
1913 39.9 45.7 
1914 39. 7 44.3 
The mounting demand for 
. iron and steel during and after 
the Russo-Japanese War brought 
about an increase in the demand 
for making steel and for iron 
castings. This was an indication 
that the steel manufacturing by 
civilian hands and at shipbuilding 
yards and arsenals was witnessing 
a marked development. Inspite 
of these development, the produc-
tion of Japan's pig iron manufact 
uring industry, which still suffered 
under the pressure of imported pig 
iron, was inadequate to fully meet 
the domestic dema:nd, and, naturally, Japan's reliance on foreign-manu-
factured pig iron remained to the same extent as before. The fact was 
that private steel manufacturers had to depend chiefly on an imported pig 
iron as the material for their steel production and only a fraction of 
their requirements were met by domestically-manufactured pig iron. 
The post-war panic during 1907-1908 (this panic inJapan was worsened by 
the effects of the panic which started in U.S.A. in the autumn of 1907 and 
did not recede until 1910), coupled by the dumping of pig iron at the hands 
of the panic-affected foreign merchants, affected Japan's private steel 
manufacturing industry so adversely that the young rising steel industry 
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was for a time forced to see its 
led to the importation of Indian 
considerably lower price. 
growth checked. 





quoted at a 
Now, let us review the problem from a point of view of the tariff 
policy. With the inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works and the beginn-
ing of the supply of iron ores from Tayeh, the Government took the steps 
in 1901 to alolish the import tariffs, on iron ore. However, with regard 
to the import of pig iron, the tariff imposition was continued, even after 
the revision of tariff agreemant effected in 1899, at the rate prescribed for 
in the agreement on revised' tariff agreement reached in 1865, and this 
practice was kept up to March, 1925.') While this indicates the lack of 
favorable conditions for making possible the adoption of a protective tariff 
measures for the domestic pig iron industry against the imported pig 
iron, it also showed that the situation remained where such conditions 
were allowed in existence. This becomes unmistakably evident when a 
comparison is made with the the German tariff rates, which already were 
on the world level; (Refer Table 5 &6). 
That the Government could not adopt a policy of positive protective 
measure not only on pig iron but also on rolled steel (the import 
duty on rolled steel, however, was somewhat rised in 1911), was, of 
course, due to the fact that Japan at that time had not yet attained her 
autonomy regarding the tariff. The positive opposition raised by the 
shipbuilding and machinery industries against such a protective policy for 
fear that such measures will bring about a rise in the price of iron and 
steel and eventually affect their industries as well as the conservative 
attitude of the general public was, partly, responsible for the continuation 
of such a situation.O) 
(4): Masayoshi Matsukata, Finance Minister in 1899, is reported to have remarked: 
"There is practically no chanse in protecting even the iron and steel manufacturing 
industry, which will constitute the backbone of the Japanese industry in the future, and 
since this item (pig iron and steel etc) on which tariff rate is fixed is imported in 
substantial quantity, its adverse effects on the country's revenue etc., is indeed very 
great." CZei-Kan 80 nen shO-shi., 1954 - 80 years short history of Japanese coustom house 
-p.48) 
(5): It is recorded that even Dr. Umiichi Toda, (professor at Kyoto University) who 
was then considered to be one of the most impartial scholar made the following 
remark concerning the self-supply of steel: "Although I am never behind anybody 
in recognizing the importance of the iron and steel industry, I would propose that, 
in case there is no prospect of attaining the self-supply of iron and steel within our 
country, the only alternative would be to have the military demand supplied dom-
estically and have the major demand met by cheap imported product, and, in the light 
of this consideration, there is absolutely no need to impose high import duties on it." 
(U. Tod., Nippon no Kei;;;ai., J9lJ-Japanese Economy-p. 424, pp. 526-527) 
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It is noted, in this connection, that the intensification of the inter-
national competition for acquisition of markets naturally tended to work 
against the protection of basic industries, while the threats of war and .the 
consequent acceleration of armament race also worked against a systematic 
combination of our pig iron and steel manufacturing industries. This,.in 
other words, had to kept the pig iron and steel industries separated as they 
had ever been since the early years of Meiji, era, and to stimulated civi-
lian industries to continue to rely upon foreign pig iron. This, incidentally, 
served to offer a foundation on which pig iron was destined to playa 
highly important role as far as the material for japan's steel manufacturing 
industry was concerned. 
-'-
Table 5. Comparison of Tariff Rates in force in Japan & 
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Table 6. Transition of Tariff Rates on Pig Iron 
(Sen per 100 kin) 
Years I Autonomous, Tariff I Conventional Tariff 
Up till end of 1898 4. 7 
8.3 8.3 From jan. I, 1899 (5%) (5%) 
From Apr. I, 1903 11.3 --(8%) 
From Oct. I, 1906 10.0 --(5%) 
From july 16,1911 , 10.0 8.3 (5%) (4.2%) 
From Mar.29,1926 10.0 Abolished 
In the tariff revision effected in 1911, the duties on rolled steel were 
increased to 10-30%, which, virtually, was a step taken in the direction of 
an exclusive protective policy. In spite of thjs, and, further, in spite of 
the fact that the measure meant an implicit support on the part of those 
engaged in manufacturing of steel with imported pig iron, the reason why 
a actual tariff rate of 4.2% was agreed on between Japan and England 
should not be found in the lack, as mentioned earlier, of such factors, on 
the part of Japan, which would stimulate a positive policy for the protec-
, 
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tion of the pig iron industry. 
While it was with civilian capital at the background that a forward step 
was thus taken for the protection of steel industy, it should not be overlooked 
that the existence of the Nippon Seiko-Sho Gapan Steel Works) at Muroran, 
(in -Hokkaido) spoke much for the reduction of tariff rates on pig iron. 
Nippon Seiko-Sho which was inaugurated at Muroran in 1907, was 
a establish as a joint venture of Armstrong and Vickers, two of the 
first-rate arms manufacturing companies in England together with the 
Hokkaido Tanko Kisen Company (an affiliate of the Mitsui-Zaibatsu), and 
as such was the target of worldwide attention. This company was virtually 
a plant where arm and armament required by the Japanese Navy were 
manufactured, and it ranked among the foremost arms factories under private 
management, not only in Japan but in Asia. 
The Nippon Seiko-Sho started its operation in January, 1911, with a 
capital of ¥ 15,000,000 (shared evenly by Japan and England), and an 
additional ¥ 10,000,000 was collected through the issuance of corporation 
debentures. This total of ¥25,000,000 was well above the ¥20,000,000 
investment requred for the initial inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works. 
It is estimated that, immediately prior to World War I, the companys fixed 
assets was valued at no less than ¥22,000,000, which closely followed 
Yawata's ¥34,000,000.-(This may be compared with significant implications, 
with the case of the Nippon Kokan Co., Uapan Steel Tube Co.,] inaugurated 
in 1912, with a capital of ¥2,000,000, the initial .amount paid-in reaching 
mere ¥ 1,200,000.) Further,Nippon Seiko-Sho was ahead of Yawata Iron 
Works in erecting two 50-ton acid open hearth furnaces. 
England made her successive advances in this part of the world in 
consequence of the conclusion of the second Anglo-Japanese military al-
liance pact in August, 1905, and, further, in order to substantiate the third 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance effected in 1911, which was intended to protect 
the British interests in the Far East against the inroads of the newcomer, 
Germany, after the defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan. This, in other 
words, was to say that Japan's position as a watchdog for Britain was fir-
mly established. Secondly, England, in these moves, was motivated by the 
necessity of investing overseas her surplus capital consequent upon the 
worldwide financial panic in 1907.6) Thirdly, England desired to maintain 
her market in the face of the growing expansion of Japan's military indu-
stry, and, lastly but not the leastly, she attempted to control, the arms 
(6); As have been refered to earlier in this article, this particular circumstance should 
also be taken into account in explajning the rapid ;ncrease in investment of foreign 
capital in our country after the Russo-Japanese War. 
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weapons used by Japanese Navy. England, at the same time, was shrewd 
enough to have it stipulated that the pig u;on used at Muroran be confined 
to that imported from England. These factors existed behind the motives 
when she agreed upon tariffrate on imported pig iron and raised a 
consistent opposition to any raise on import duties on iron and pig iron.') 
This, however, does not mean that Japan, on these accounts, gave up 
taking measures towards the eventual self-supply of pig iron. The succes-
sive expansion at Yawata Iron Works was one indication of this, while 
Japan's determination was more eloquently indicated in her insistent en-
deavor to secure her control of coal mines as well as iron ore deposits on 
the Cntinent of China. The plan was already on her timetable, and the 
ambitious undertaking had already been initiated in the increased import 
of pig iron manufactured at Hanyang in 190~. In 1907, 24% of the total 
import of pig iron was from Hanyang. FuJthermore, the Hanyang pig 
iron was being quoted at a much lower price than the English-manu 
faclured product. (Refer Tables 7 and 8). 
In October and December, 1906, Imperial decrees were issued, which 
stipulated that products imported from the Kwantung leased territory and 
pig iron manufactured in China mainland will be treated equally under the 
conventional tariff-rate. This further indicates that Japan was intent upon 
her policy of supplementing domestically-manufactured pig iron, with pig 
iorn imported from the China mainland. With the issuance of the afore-
mentioned Imperial decrees the autonomous tariff rate of 10 sen per Kin 
imposed on the Hanyang pig iron used at the Yawata Iron Works, was 
lowered to 8.3 sen as same as those imposed on British and other country's 
pig iron. This, on the other hand, placed an additional handicap on the 
part of the domestic pig iron manufacturing industry, which had no tariff 
protection. The monopoly of the cheap Chinese pig iron by the Yawata 
Iron Works, oppressed the operation at Kamaishi, and this had an adverse 
affect on the domestic production of pig iron as a whole. This same policy 
of securing steel material from the China mainland followed both by the 
government and· the Zaibatsu alike was continued and expanded through 
the Taisho era (1912-1926), and this policy itself served as a deterrent 
in raising thet ariff rates on pig iron. 
Towards the closing years of the Meiji era, the weight of English pig 
iron gradually decreased, and had given place to the Indian-manufactured 
pig iron, which eventually replaced the pig iron imported from China. The 
(7), The agreement further stipulated that the Japanese Government will not pay any 
special subsidy for encouraging the manufacture of pig iron. 
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emergence of China and India as the sources of steel material supply, 
later proposes an important problem on the supply of pig iron. This par-
ticular point will not be taken up in this article. Mention should here be 
made of Korea, which was annexed to Japan, in 1910. In Korea the old 
tariff rates were allowed to continue for another ten years. Furthermore, 
no specific steps were taken on the tariff provisions on iron and other 
products, because Japan at that time was endeavoring to rectify her own 
unequal treaties and was fearful of resentiment and repercussions by the 








Table 7. Comparison of Pig Iron Imports from 
Foreign Countries (1,000 tons) 
Total I Ratio against I 




12 41% 87% 
-% 
44 62 85 -
29 41 73 6 
97 41 71 24 
229 49 69 3 I 
265 52 38 23 I 
Table 8. Comparison of Import Prices of Pig Iron 
(Yen per ton) 
I 
Domestic 




pig iron pIg Iron pig iron pig iron 
37.9 34.3 27.9 -
41. 0 37.6 34. I -








3. Summary--Concerning the raw material 
problem and the resources 
I 
In the foregoing chapters, main attention was focussed on the process 
of the growth of Japan's iron and steel industry, represented by the 
phenomenal growth of the Yawata Iron Works, and we have tried to trace 
the history of how the problem of raw materials was handled together 
various other factors underlying this vital problem. As a summary of the 
chronological description of the problem of raw materials, the attempt 
will be made in the following lines to enunciate the peculiarities of this 
problem, especially in relation to the iron ore resources. 
. It has already been clarified that japan's raw material problem was 
Intertwined with her capitalistic production system. Even supposing that 
her domestic resources were inadequate to meet the demand, a solution 
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can invariably be found in a progressive modification of her production 
formula. This should, on the other hand signify that with the change in 
her production formula the solution of raw material problem can also keep 
up with this change. From this point, any attempt to justify the content-
ion that the peculiar development of the raw material problem in Japan is 
due to the lack of raw materials, should be discarded as entirely erroneous 
as overlooking the controlable nature (economic factor) of such resources. 
This, however, is not to assert that the contemporary and subsequent 
development of Japan's iron and steel industry was brought about entirely 
free from the restraints resulting from the inadequate resources. It should 
be definitely stated that the traditional lack of iron ore resources in Japan 
(it goes without saying, of course, that this lack, in itself, was brought 
about, historically, by capital'l) constituted a powerful factor determining 
the shape of Japan's iron and steel industry, and also, the peculiar aspect 
her raw material problem. While, of course, the richness and the location 
and in what shape the iron ore resources is formed, provided that rise and 
decline of wages is kept out of consideration, they will constitute a major 
factor which goes to determine the price of raw material. In case of 
Japan, however, it was undeniable that the amount of iron ores in ex-
istence in utilizable condition, apart from their absolute amount was, in 
spite of their comparatively high purity, were quantitatively inadequate to 
meet the growing demand of her iron and steel industry. That these ores 
were located in various different localities, as has already been shown by 
surveys which have been undertaken from time to time, is a another disad-
vantage to be borne by Japan's steel industry. 
These umfavorable conditions within the country, as has been men-
tioned earlier, unavoidably drove Japan on her ambitious schemes of securing 
the iron ore supply from Tayeh, where the resources were found tg be in 
a much advantageous conditions both in regard to their richness and shape 
of deposits. 
It should be noted, however, the circumstance referred to in the fore-
going lines became a decisive factor for determining the peculiar develop-
ment of japan's raw material problem only under her peculiar capitalistic 
production system, which faced the rapid growth of the international mo-
nopolistic capitalism, and also under the condition that it, was unable to 
transform both the qualitative and quantitative composition of her iron 
resources. 
(8): It was only after the inauguration of the Yawata Iron Works that the shor-
tage of raw material resources came to the fore as a burning issue in Japan. 
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Even though it should be conceded that Japan's iron resources were 
both inadequate in amount and were located at widely dispersed areas, it 
should not be taken that the amount was absolutely insufficient to meet 
the demand for iron ores required for making pig iron. It was only be-
cause, at the contemporary stage of development of industrial production, 
it was found both unprofitable and impossible, in regard to the price, to 
have the iron ore production raised to the level where the demand stood. 
There was a inter-relationship between the supply of iron ore from the 
China and the production of iron ores at domestic mines. Japan's advance 
to the China Continent and securing of iron ore supply from there inevi-
tably resulted in a reduction of iron ore production at home. For an ex-
pample, the operation at Kamaishi which relied on domestic iron ore supply 
for its pig iron production was affected and this in turn, worked to check 
the production of iron ores at home. (Refer Table 9) 
Table 9. lion Ores & Production Index 
(Unit 1,000 tons: 1901 as 100) 
I Iron Ore II Its Index I Pig Iron Output Index 
1901 48 100 100 
1907 104 216 246 
1914 121 272 526 
This circle of co-relation, further, caused a lessening in utilization of 
such resources as iron sands and sulfureted iron ores. An attempt had already 
been made as early as 1883 at the Hiroshima iron mines to utilize the iron 
sands, estimated to be deposited in the Japanese islands in several hundred 
million tons or even virtually inexhaustible, for the production of pig iron. 
A vast scheme of development was presented to Masayoshi Matsukata by 
Fuyukichi Kobana, was in charge of the mines (in 1888). The plan, ho-
wever, was not approved and no further development was seen at the Hi-
roshima mines. What blocked the utilization of iron sands in the Western 
method of pig iron manufacturing was, among others, the difficulty in mi-
ning, selection, consolidation and transportation of iron sands as well as 
the difficulty encountered in the separation of titanium component and also 
the troubles attendant on the ownership rof the mine areas. With the 
suspension of the operation at the Hiroshima mines, any large-scale inves-
tigation and survey of iron sands resources was practically completely aban-
doned by both the government and civilian enterprisers, until the underta-
king was taken up for a second time in 1916. 
The same situation applied to the sulfureted iron ores, the deposits of 
which are richly found in Japan. As early as 1887, an attempt was made at 
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the Yamane smelting plant of the Sumitomo-operated Besshi Copper Mines, 
(in Shikoku) to separate, according to the Western process, the component 
copper, sulphur, iron and others from copper-containing sulfureted iron 
ores. While this was the first occasion in Japan that sulfuric acid was 
manufactured out of sulfureted iron ore, further attempt at manufacturing 
iron with the use of the so-called sulfuric refuse (containing 40-60% of 
iron) after copper, sulphur and the other components had been extricated, 
was made for the first time by a special iron manufacturing corps set up 
at the same smelting plant in June, 1890. However, extrication of the 
copper component from the ore was found so difficult that the attempt 
was given up already in November, 1894. 
While the commencement of the manufacture of sulfuric acid from the 
sulfureted iron ore encouraged the production of the latter in Japan, its 
use for manufacturing iron had to be abandoned at this level of develop-
ment, until, 1920, when new researches in this particular field were again 
taken up. However, Japan's contemporary private capitalists were unable 
to finance such researches on a big scale and consecutively for a lengthy 
period (For instance, the Sumitomo then could appropriate a sum of ¥ 100, 
000 as researoh funds spread over five years; the project, which began in 
1893 was discontinued after only one year). The government, on the other 
hand, was so eager upon securing the supply of necessary ores from China 
that it naturally give up attempt to develope the domestic resources. Thus, 
various factors combined to make the original shortage of ore resources at 
home be felt more acutely, and this fact must not be overlooked. 
Now, let us turn our eye on aspects of survey conducted on ore reso-
urces at home. Although the richness and location and type of deposit of 
the iron ores are what are bestowed under specific geographical and nat-
ural conditions, but. the recognition of their very entity must await the 
survey by human intellect. The commencement of the investigation of 
the iron resources and its reserves in Japan roughly coincided "'lith the 
acceptance of iron as the foundation of modern industry and its recognition 
as an indispensable resource. The first investigation of Japan's iron 
resources was conducted in July, 1872 by a foreigner, named Godfrey, 
who, as an employee of the Japan's Ministry of Industry. He inspected 
the iron mines located over a widely separated areas in the northern 
Honshu, and as a result of his survey he reported on the superiority 
of Kamaishi mines. In 1875 another foreign employee conducted further 
investigation of Nakakosaka mine at Kamaishi. This was fol lowed 
by a pesimistic report prepared by a Yajiro Ito of the Ministry of 
Industry, to the effect that reserves at Kamaishi amounted to merely 
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130,000 tons. The reliability of this report is doubtful, as it may easily 
be presumed that it was prepared for the ulterior purpose of placing the 
responsibility for the failure of the management of Kamaishi at the door 
of the shortage of the resources available. 
In 1883 the Geological Research Institute was established within the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, which undertook minor-scale 
investigations. These investigations, however, were no doubt far from being 
thorough. 
The first step in full-fledged inve.Jtigations of iron ore resources, was 
taken only after the bill for inaugurating a government-run iron manufact-
uring factory was rejected by the second session of the Diet in 1891 for 
the reasons of the inadequacy of the preliminary investigation of raw ma-
terial resources, and by the establishment of the commission to conduct 
investigation on the steel industry in June 1892. Senichi Otsuka, of the 
afore-mentioned Geological Research Institute, who engaged in the in-
vestigation, was critical of the Ito report referred to above, and asserted 
that it would be possible to turn out 6,500,000 tons of pig iron with the 
iron ore resources deposited in the Kamaishi area. This would mean, his 
report said, that, at the rate of 50,000-ton output per year, a continuous 
production of pig iron for 130 years to follow would be possible. On the 
basis of these reports, the Commission, in September, 1892, submitted to the 
Government an advice regarding the results obtained by the investigations 
of the iron mines at Kamaishi, Sennin and Akatani and that of the iron sands 
deposits located in Hokkaido. The conclusion of this report ran as follows: 
"An estimate of the iron ore deposit at the four mines just surveyed, 
which can be easily mined' being comparatively near the surface will 
safely be put at no less than 15,650,000 tons, from which well over 7,360, 
000 tons of pig iron con be manufactured. In addition to these, there 
undoubtedly are to be found other localities where rich iron deposits are 
expected, which, however, are not yet investigated .... ».... As innumerable 
other spots are believed to have rich deposits still untapped, it would sa-
fely be admitted that, as far as iron manufacturing is concerned, there 
should be no fear of its raw material being in shortage."") 
That this report was rather optimistic is undisputedly evident. It, 
however, was highly significant in that it indicated that the shortage of 
raw materials, often voiced at that time, was not entirely due to a short-
.. ' age of resources. Suggestive in this connection is a report written by Ar-
Colonel Yasuhisa Kate') about the same time. The report, in part, 
(9) Teesu-k. (Consideration into the Iron), 1893, pp. 93-107. 
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said; "It is simply beyond expectations that the Kamaishi area is deposited 
inexhaustibly with iron ore resources and bountiful charcoal fuel resources. 
In spite of this, the area at present produces small amount of pig iron, 
which is of such inferior quality. What is the reason for this? It is simply 
because the method of mining and transporting is still far from being 
satisfactory, while the machinery in use there are mostly of inferior quality 
and the refining process is void of uniformity."'") The report, in conclu-
sion, advised that the avowed shortage of raw material was, actually, due 
toa shortage of capital needed for improving the installations. 
Then, the report by the provisional commission for the investigation 
of the iron manufacturing enterprise, submitted in October, 1883, was si-
milarly critical of the previous contention that the failure of Kamaishi 
was caused by a shortage of raw material and, in its turn, tried to find 
the causes for the faulure in: (1) inadequacy of investigation. of raw ma-
terial; (2) the area where mining of iron ores was made was too limited; 
(3) insufficient supply of charcoal and coal fuel; (4) unsatisfactory trans-
portation facilities in the mining area; (5) small demand for iron products; 
(6) high price of pig iron; and (7) unskilled techniques. 
The iron ore deposits at Kamaishi were further subjected to successive 
surveys. While the estimate in 1892 stood at 14,000,000 tons, that towards 
the end of 1895 stood at 49,000,000 tons. However, such optimism, as 
described in the foregoing lines, was destined to be short-lived, for, as soon 
as Japan found itself in a position to be assured of a supply of iron ores 
from Tayeh coupled by a growing demand for iron, such theory against 
the alleged shortage of ore resources was at once discarded. And, this 
was immediately followed by a theory, emphasizing that japan's iron ore 
resources were in utter shortage, which attempted to justify Japan's advan-
ces on the China continent. Optimism about iron ore resources in Japan 
was never to be seen again. ll ) 
After this, Japan's effort in regard to survey and investigation of 
iron ore resources, which was conducted jointly by the government and 
the powerful Zaibatsu was exclusively concentrated in Korea, Manchuria, 
Northern China and the extensive area on the Yangtze central around 
Tayeh. 
(10): ibid., p. 157. 
(II): The shortage of the iron resources in Japan was for the first time officially 
reported to the world j,n a report presented by Kinosuke Inoue to the 1910 International 
Convention on Geology. According to Inoue, the iron ore deposits actually investigated 
then amounted to 18,790,000 tons, while he :estimated. that the total deposits would 
amount to 36,000,000 tons. 
,-
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Thus, it is seen that, as the iron and steel industry grew in Japan, 
demands for raw materials for the industry, also increased and in order 
that the price of raw materials will be kept stable despite the unavoida-
ble tendency that it was liable to rise, effort were made to stress on an 
international scale of japan's inherent shortage in the resources and all 
efforts were made to secure resouces on the Continent. This amply accounts 
for the fact that investigation of resources at home was never thoroughly 
carried out. Just as, the paucity of China's own iron resources, and not 
her lingering semi-feudalistic institutions and her sUbjugation to Western 
inperialistic aggression, was held chiefly responsile for her remaining in a 
semi-colonial statius, so the issue of a shortage of japan's iron resources, 
was exclusively taken up for explaning away every aspect of her iron and 
steel industry, at the same time justifying her aggresive adventures on the 
China Continent. 
The above statement should not, however, be construed as implying 
that japan's iron resources, both with regard to richness and shape of de-
posit, have ever been bountiful. 
That Japan's resources were no comparison, as far as the contemporary 
investigations went, to the deposits at Tayeh was undeniable, for the lat-
ter justly boasted of a deposit estimated at 100,000,000 tons, of which no 
less than 18,000,000 tons were considered to be immediately available.") 
What the writer wishes to make clear is the fact that the absolute 
amount of resources concerned alone is never the exclusive factor which 
makes an alleged shortage of such resources be felt more acutely, and that 
the problem of resources, which is of controlable nature (economic factor), 
is handled as noncontrolable nature (physical factor) also originates from 
the capitalistic production system. 
(12): While Japan's iron resources at that time had not yet been subjected to ade. 
quate, and sufficient investigation, the estimated deposits immediately available by dig-
ging, according to a report made by the Bureau of Mining in 1916, amounted roughly 
to 70, ODD, 000 tons (excepting iron sands). Nine mines were estimated to have deposits 
more than I, 000, 000 tons, of which the majority (with the sole exception of Kamaishi, 
with 35,000,000 tons) had deposits ranging well below 10,000,000 tons. 
